Volume 65

Issue 2

Article 4

February 1963

Legislative Reapportionment: Baker v. Carr
James Kilgore Edmundson Jr.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Legislation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James K. Edmundson Jr., Legislative Reapportionment: Baker v. Carr, 65 W. Va. L. Rev. (1963).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol65/iss2/4

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Edmundson: Legislative Reapportionment: Baker v. Carr

West Virginia Law Review
Published by the College of Law of West Virginia University. Official

publication of The West Virginia Bar Association.

STUDENT BOARD OF EDITORS
Charles Henry Rudolph, Jr., Editor in Chief

Forest Jackson Bowman, Associate Editor

John Templeton Kay, Jr., Associate Editor

Robert Glenn Steele, Associate Editor
William Erwin Barr
Harold Dale Brewster, Jr.
Robert William Burk, Jr.
John Everett Busch
Earl Moss Curry, Jr.
Ralph Charles Dusic, Jr.
James Kilgore Edmundson, Jr.
Frank Thomas Graff, Jr.
Robert Edward Haden

Eugene Triplett Hague, Jr.
David Mayer Katz
Lee Ames Luce
Thomas Franklin McCoy
Thomas Edward McHugh
Charles David McMunn
Thomas Richard Ralston
Sterl Franklin Shinaberry
Stephen Grant Young

Willard D. Lorensen, Faculty Editor in Charge
Agnes A. Furman, Business Manager

STUDENT NOTES

Legislative Reapportionment: Baker v. Carr
After the War for American Independence, the founders of our
nation met in Philadelphia in 1787 to revise the Articles of Confederation. The product of that convention was the Constitution of
the United States, the organic law upon which our country is founded.
Although the Revolutionary War had been fought to gain liberty and
justice for all, the new government, as contemplated by the framers,
was anything but democratic. Rather the emphasis in our fundamental law was on a republican form of government as it was
popularly conceived in that day. However, the Constitution, being
the result of compromise, was not completely devoid of democratic
principles. At least, in the House of Representatives the people had
a direct and generally equal voice. But this was offset by a Senate
elected by the states through their respective legislatures, and by an
[ 129 ]
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executive branch chosen by the Electoral College. To be sure
the people selected both the state legislators and the members of
the Electoral College, but neither group was constitutionally bound
by the majority will. Finally, even the Supreme Court of the United
States was composed of appointees of the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.
Since the founding of our nation, startling changes have occurred in our organic scheme, for the republic has been steadily transformed into a democracy. In the Jacksonian era, state constitutions
were amended to broaden the franchise. In 1865, the fifteenth
amendment secured the vote for the Negro and other minority groups.
In 1913, the seventeenth amendment provided for the direct election of the Senate. Finally, in 1919 the nineteenth amendment
gave the vote to women. But the principle of government by the
chosen few still persists, and lawmakers elected by a minority of
the people govern many states today. The federal judiciary, heretofore, has been reluctant to follow this trend of departure from republican principles, especially in those areas dealing with what the
Supreme Court deemed judicially unenforceable political questions.
Recently, however, in Baker v. Carr,' a case originating in Tennessee,
the Supreme Court took up the gauntlet by upholding a federal right
to democratic rule grounded in the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, thus, laying to rest the political question
doctrine as it applied to the states.
The Tennessee Constitution prescribes in some detail the
method of apportioning legislative seats in the state Senate and
House of Representatives.' Generally, that constitution requires that
representation be based proportionally on the number of qualified
voters in the state.' Suit was instituted in a federal district court
against the governor and other state officials to force legislative
reapportionment.' The complaint alleged in substance that the
General Assembly had consistently failed to reapportion since 1901;'
that direct action by the electorate through constitutional amendment
or convention had been effectively blocked by legislative control;6
1368 U. S. 186 (1962).
2 TENN. CoNsT. art. I1, §§ 3-6.
3 TENN. CoNsT. art. 1I §§ 5 & 6.
4 Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 834 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
5 TENN. S. Jour. 909.930 (1957).
6 The power of initiative is unavailable in Tennessee, and the General
Assembly provides the plan of representation for a Constitutional Convention.
TENN. CONST. art. X, § 3.
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that the Supreme Court of Tennessee had declined jurisdiction
in a similar case;' and that, therefore, the plaintiffs were denied
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. A panel of three judges,8 sitting as a district court, dismissed
the action, first, on the ground that the complaint failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted, and second, because the
district court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter. On direct
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed.9
The district court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; a
justiciable claim was stated which, if proven, entitled plaintiffs to
relief; and the plaintiffs had standing to sue.
The brunt of the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan was
preoccupied with the evasive issue of justiciability." That issue
was raised by the defendants, who contended that the only constitutional right an apportionment case involved was the judicially
unenforceable guaranty of a republican form of government;" moreover, that the Court was bound by a series of similar reapportionment cases beginning with Colegrove v. Green,'" wherein the fourteenth amendment' 3 was unsuccessfully asserted as a ground for
relief. Under these circumstances, the majority was compelled to
consider first the "contours of the political question doctrine."
Mr. Justice Brennan gleaned the following reasons from prior
decisions as to why the Court should refuse to entertain jurisdiction
in a given case:
(1) The issue was constitutionally committeed to another branch of federal government;
(2) No judicially discoverable and manageable standards were available to the Court;
(3) The Court could not decide the issue, and at the
same time show due respect for a coordinate
branch of federal government;
7

Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956), affd per
curiam, 352 U.S. 520 (1957).
8 Whenever state action is alleged to be contrary to federal law, a three
judge court is convened to hear the case. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958).
9 Baker v. Carr, 368 U.S. 186 (1962).
10 Justiciability is whether the issue presented is suitable for judicial
determination.
"I'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government... ." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
12 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
13 "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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(4) The decision necessarily involved potential embarrassment arising from conflicting opinions
among the branches of federal government;
(5) The need to attach finality to a decision already
made by a coordinate branch of federal government.
The opinion concluded that it was the relationship between the federal
judiciary and the other branches of federal government, not a concern
with federal-state conflict, which gave life to the political question
doctrine. In this manner, the majority of the court distinguished
both the guaranty clause and prior reapportionment decisions from
Baker v. Carr.
In order to clarify the majority position, Mr. Justice Brennan
reviewed a series of Supreme Court cases invoking the guaranty
clause, beginning with the classic attempt of Luther v. Borden."
That case arose out of Rhode Island, where in 1842 the organic law
limited suffrage to freeholders. After futile attempts to extend the
franchise by other means, dissident citizens called a convention, which
adopted a constitution allegedly ratified by a majority of male citizens
over twenty-one and by a majority of freeholders. Separate governments, martial, law, and insurrection resulted. Luther v. Borden,'"
an action in trespass, ultimately posed the issue of the legality of
the competing governments. Substantially, the Supreme Court
held that the enforcement of the guaranty clause was a function
of the executive and legislative branches of federal government; that
it was the duty of the President to either recognize or disavow the
established government, the duty of Congress to decide conflicting
claims to Congressional seats; and that, in any event, no judically
manageable yardstick was available for the Court to apply. In Taylor
v. Becham,'6 the Supreme Court was faced with a situation similar
to the Borden case in that competing claims for the office of governor
of Kentucky were presented. The Court declined to exercise jurisdiction in the Kentucky case because the question was one for the
political departments and not a proper subject for judicial determination. The Court adopted an argument asserted by Daniel
Webster in Luther v. Borden" that the Federal Constitution only
guaranteed lawful and orderly procedure by state governments. The
1448 U.S. 1 (1849).
l-Id.

16 178 U.S. 548 (1899).
1748

U.S. 1 (1849).
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Supreme Court continued to refuse to apply the guaranty clause in
cases of successive challenges to a state constitutional amendment
adopting the initiative and referendum; 8 to state constitutional
amendment procedure; 9 to legislative authority to delegate a ministerial function to a court;2" to referendum of apportionment legislation;2' to state appellate procedure in affirming judgements of
intermediate courts;22 and to delegation of legislative powers.2 3
These cases covered a period of one hundred years, but side by
side this judicial refusal to apply the guaranty clause, the equal protection clause was mounting in importance. In 1880, the statutory
exclusion from a panel of jurymen of persons of the same race as
defendant was held a denial of equal protection of the laws.24 In
1928, a Texas statute which prohibited Negro participation in a
Democratic primary was held a denial of franchise in violation of
the equal protection clause. In 1938, the failure to provide Negroes
with legal training within the jurisdiction of the state, where such a
privilege was accorded a white person, was a discriminatory violation
of the equal protection clause.26 In 1954, the separate, but equal
facilities provided Negro school children inherently instilled a feeling
of inferiority and denied equal protection of the laws.2" This growing
preoccupation with the protection of civil liberties and the preservation of human rights against state action did not extend to the
issue of equal representation until 1962. In fact, in 1946 the Supreme
Court failed to grant relief in Colegrove v. Green,2" which was a
suit based on the equal protection clause. That case came to be the
foremost stumbling block to federal judicial intervention in state
legislative reapportionment.
In Colegrove v. Green,29 suit was brought in a federal district
court in Illinois to restrain a primary certifying board from further
proceeding toward setting up an election, because the state legislature
had failed to reapportion Congressional districts. The Supreme Court,
18 Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1911).
19 Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913).
20 O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 234 (1915).
21 Davis v. Ohio, 241 U.S. 565 (1915).
22 Oio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74
(1929).
23
Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1936).
24
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
25
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
26
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
27
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28328 U.S. 549 (1946).
29
1d.
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seven members sitting, refused to entertain the merits. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in dissent in Baker v. Carr construed Colegrove v.
Green"0 as a refusal to decide a political question, whereas Mr.
Justice Brennan viewed the decision as a dismissal for want of
equity. As it happened, three Justices concurred in one opinion,
while three Justices dissented. Mr. Justice Rutledge held the balance
of power. In a separate opinion, he agreed on the one hand with
the dissenters that the Court had judisdiction of the subject matter,
while on the other hand he held with the "majority" that the appeal
should be dismissed for want of equity. The Justice reasoned that
the question was nearly moot; moreover, although the Constitution
possibly conferred a right of equality, such right was diluted by
vesting enforcement in the political departments of federal government. Whatever the ground for distinguishing Golegrove v. Green"
from Baker v. Carr, it is clear that the Supreme Court in the former
case could well have been concerned with its relationship with the
Congress rather than with federal-state conflict; thus, the political
question doctrine was applicable. Mr. Justice Black in his dissent
in Colegrove v. Green" felt that the district court had jurisdiction
of the subject matter; that the claim was justiciable; and that the
plaintiffs had standing to sue. It is important to note that this was
the precise holding in Baker v. Carr, but the Court went no further
because the defendants had not yet formally answered.
Two concurring opinions, however, did reach the merits in Baker
v. Carr. In one of the opinions, Mr. Justice Douglas admitted that
states may impose qualifications on the right to vote, but certain
constitutional amendments clearly prohibited state restriction of the
franchise solely on the basis of race, color, creed, previous condition
of servitude or sex. The fourteenth amendment imposed a further
restriction: state law must not be so arbitrary as to amount to
invidious discrimination. This was substantially the view of Mr.
Justice Black in Colegrove v. Green." In a second concurring opinion
in Baker v. Carr, Mr. Justice Clark took the law of the case from
MacDougall v. Green. 4 In that case, members and nominees of a
minor party attacked an Illinois statute, which required signatures
from 50 counties before the party candidates could be placed on the
ballot. At the time, 87% of the state population resided in 49 of
30ld.

Id.
Id. at 566.

31
32
33 Id.
34

335 U.S. 281 (1948).
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the most populas counties. In declining jurisdiction without regard
to the political question doctrine, the Supreme Court reasoned that
numbers alone do not constitute political power, and that a rational
state policy might require that voting power of a political party be
evenly distributed. Plainly, Mr. Justice Clark felt that unless it
appeared prima facie that a state agency had indulged in invidious
discrimination as to the voting franchise, the equal protection clause
was not violated. The Justice relied on two cases. First, in Williamson v. Lee Optical,3" opticians were required by Oklahoma statute
to fit old lens to new frames or grind new lens only when a prescription from a licensed specialist was received. However, ready
made glasses were exempted from compliance with the statute. The
Supreme Court held this classification to be a proper measure to
insure the health of state citizens. Second, in McGowan v. Maryland," a challenge to Sunday blue laws, the Court concluded that
a statute will not be set aside if a state of facts may be reasonably
conceived to justify it. Under the views of these concurring opinions,
illustrative reapportionment cases before and after Baker v. Carr
will be examined.
After Colegrove v. Green,"' succeeding Supreme Court per
curiam opinions affirmed federal and state decisions denying relief
against malapportionment.38 But not all courts followed this path.
In Minnesota in 1958, a federal district court granted jurisdiction
under the equal protection clause, but withheld relief to afford the
legislature an opportunity to act.39 The legislature met in extraordinary session, enacted a reapportionment act, and, thereupon,
plaintiffs were granted a dismissal without prejudice.40 In 1960, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held reapportionment a justiciable issue,
rejecting an argument, based on the theory of separation of powers,
that the judiciary was encroaching on a coordinate branch.4" The
New Jersey court felt that legislative inaction was just as much a
denial of voting rights as was legislative action, and that probably
such inaction amounted to a denial of the federal right to equal
35 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
36

366 U.S. 420 (1961).

37
328 U.S. 549 (1945).
38

Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Radford v. Gary, 352
U.S. 991 (1957); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v. Smith,
342 U.S. 916 (1952); Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Cook v.
329 U.S. 675 (1946).
Fortson,
39
Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958).
40
Magraw v. Donovan, 177 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn. 1959).
41 Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
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protection of the laws. Again relief was held in abeyance to afford
an opportunity for legislative action.
Several other decisions worthy of note involved the Georgia
County Unit System, which is roughly comparable to the presidential
electoral system. The Unit System applies in congressional, gubernatorial, and state legislative elections in Georgia. Suppose that
counties X, Y, and Z, composing one congressional district, have a
population of 500,000, 250,000, and 100,000 respectively. Both
X and Y are allotted 6 unit votes each, while Z is accorded 2. If a
candidate carries county X, but not Y or Z, he loses the election,
although he may have received a substantial majority of the popular
vote. So it was in Cook v. Fortson,42 where a federal district court
denied relief to a congressional candidate on the ground that any
inequity resulting from the County Unit System was a matter for the
Georgia legislature and Congress to resolve. In a companion case,
Turman v. Duckworth,43 instituted by a defeated gubernatorial
candidate with a majority of the popular vote, the district court
discussed the merits. The court agreed with what was later the view
of Mr. Justice Douglas in Baker v. Carr, that the Constitution proscribed against arbitrary discrimination in elections on the basis of
race, color or sex. However, unlike the Justice, the district court
was skeptical as to the application of the equal protection clause.
The court noted that equality of voting was never demanded in the
federal system; that the electoral college possessed similar inequities;
and that the residents of the District of Columbia were (at that time)
deprived of all voting franchise. Further, assuming that the equal
protection clause guaranteed a right of equality, for a classification
to be declared unconstitutional, it must be irrational, and the prevention of urban domination in elections is arguably good. In a later
Georgia case for damages, it was alleged that certification of nominees
of the Democratic Party under the County Unit System debased
the vote of plaintiff." The theory of plaintiff's case was that equal
voting was contemplated by the state constitution, and that such right
was further guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan reject this theory in Baker v. Carr, because a
state constitution and statute stand on the same footing when a
42

(1946).
43

(1946).

68 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ga. 1946), ajf'd per curiam, 329 U.S. 675
68 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ga. 1946), affd per curiam, 329 U.S. 675

44Cox v. Peters, 208 Ga. 498, 67 S.E.2d 579 (1951), affd per curiam,
342 U.S. 936 (1952).
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federal question is raised, and it is the unjustness of the statute,
not the justness of the state constitution, which controls. The Supreme Court of Georgia evaded a decision on the merits by holding
that a party primary was not an election in contemplation of the
Georgia Constitution.
After the decision in Baker v. Carr, Georgia citizens renewed
their attack on the County Unit System. " Suit was brought in federal
district court seeking reapportionment of the General Assembly of
Georgia. The court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged a
case of invidious discrimination, but that five interrelated approaches
had to be analyzed before relief could be considered:
(1) The rationality of state franchise policy;
(2) The arbitrariness of the County Unit System;
(3) The historical basis of the Unit System in political
institutions;
(4) The possibility of other existing remedy;
(5) The probability that plaintiff's federal right was
violated.
The court concluded that no policy existed to support the County
Unit System; that it was, in fact, arbitrarily discriminatory; that
perhaps when devised, the Unit System was not arbitrary, yet its long
standing provided no reason for continued existence; that the remedy
of initiative and referendum was unavailable in Georgia nor was there
any evidence that the legislature would voluntarily disturb the balance
of power; and lastly, that Baker v. Carr plainly demonstrated the
violation of a federal right similar to the plaintiff's. Jurisdiction was
retained to afford the legislature a last opportunity to act; meanwhile,
the court indicated guidelines as to what were minimum requirements.
First, the practice of rotating state senate seats among counties within
the same senatorial district was improper. Second, at least one of
the two legislative houses must be apportioned according to population.
Not all courts are in agreement with this last mentioned view of
the minimum requirements under the fourteenth amendment. In the
recent decision of Scholle v. Hare,46 the Supreme Court of Michigan
held that representation in the Michigan senate must be based on
population as was the Michigan lower house. This result was not
45 Toombs v. Fortson,
46

205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
116 N.W.2d 350 (Mich.
1962).
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reached, however, without protracted litigation. In 1960, a mandamus action was instituted, which attacked a 1952 amendment to the
Michigan Constitution fixing senatorial districts without regard to
population.4" Relying on Colegrove v. Green,4" and companion
cases, the Supreme Court of Michigan dismissed the writ. The court
felt that principles of pure democracy fly in the face of history, and
that at the time of decision, law in a majority of states still prescribed
inequality in one legislative house. One dissent read the federal
decisions to infer that it was the duty of state courts to consider reapportionment on the merits. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed this decision in light of Baker v. Carr. On remand,
the Michigan court held that the plaintiff was deprived of equal
protection of the laws by the amended provisions of the Michigan
Constitution, following the dissent in Colegrove v. Green49 and the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Baker v. Carr, that
equal protection implies that all votes be substantially equal in
weight. Realizing that some weighting was necessary, the Michigan
court held that a senatorial district with twice the population per
senator as another district was bad and that a district with less a
disparity may not be good. Mr. Chief Justice Carr in dissent questioned
the irrationality of a plan to prevent urban domination, since diffusion of political power was a permissable state policy, and numbers
are not the only criteria.
In Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes,11 a
Maryland circuit court reached the same result as the minority in
Scholle v. Hare.5" In the Maryland case, plaintiffs were seeking
reapportionment of the Maryland Senate and demonstrated that a
state senator from one district represented 33 constitutents for every
constituent represented by a senator from another district. The
court pointed out that a far greater disparity existed in the United
States Senate where the maximum dilution is 75 to 1. In fact, the
Maryland Senate predated its national counterpart and was its model.
The court felt that a system which disregards the population factor
protects the minority and prevents hasty, but popular legislation, and
that the Maryland Senate, as constructed, is in the best tradition of the
47

Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960), rev'd per curiam,
369 U.S. 429 (1962).
48328 U.S. 549 (1946).
49

d.

-5 Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 31 U.S.L. Week
2017 (Cir. Ct. Md. July 10, 1962).
51 116 N.W.2d 350 (Mich. 1962).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol65/iss2/4

10

Edmundson: Legislative Reapportionment: Baker v. Carr

1963 ]

STUDENT NOTES

theory of checks and balances and a republican form of government.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the senate's
basis for representation after a historical analysis.52
Following its decision in Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court remanded to the district court for further proceedings.5 3 Meanwhile,
the governor of Tennessee convened the General Assembly to pass
an apportionment act. Thereupon, the complaint was amended to
permit consideration of the new legislation. The Tennessee Constitution allows one delegate to counties with two-thirds of the minimum
population requirement. The district court held that to afford this
measure of protection to less populous counties was neither irrational
nor arbitrary; moreover, it was not invidious discrimination for the
General Assembly to extend this principle to floterial districts, even
though by so doing the state constitution was violated. However,
the district court viewed with disfavor legislative favoritism of some
counties in the House. For example, a county with less than the twothirds minimum ratio was allocated a direct representative, while
another county, also with less than the two-thirds minimum ratio,
but more population than the former county, was placed in a
floterial district. The court felt that such arbitrary apportionment
violated the equal protection guarantee. As to the state Senate, the
court could discover no rational basis whatever for its apportionment.
Thus, it was forced to instruct the General Assembly as to minimum
federal standards. First, if the House utilized the two-thirds ratio
permitted by the Tennessee Constitution, the Senate could not.
Second, either the House or Senate must be apportioned only according to population.
Like the Tennessee Constitution, the West Virginia Constitution
bases legislative representation on population, 4 but as to the House
of Delegates, if a county has three-fifths (two-thirds in Tennessee)
of the minimum required population, the West Virginia Constitution
grants that county one delegate.5 5 Any county with less than the
three-fifths ratio must be aligned with a contiguous county in a
delegate district. The ratio is determined by dividing the number of
5

2 Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 184 A.2d 715
(Md. 1962).
53 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
.4 "Every citizen shall be entitled to equal representation in the government, and, in all apportionment of representation, equality of numbers of
those entitled thereto, shall as far as practicable, be preserved." W. VA.
CONsT. art. II, § 4.
55 W. VA. CONST. art. VI § 6.
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members of the House into the most recent decennial census figures,
rejecting the fractional unit. The number of members per county is
then determined by dividing the ratio into the population of each
county or delegate district, rejecting the fractional unit. Those
counties with the largest fractional remainders are entitled to additional delegates until the total number of the House is allocated."6
Under the present plan of the legislature, each county has at least
one delegate. Thirteen counties have a population less than the
ratio,57 and, constitutionally, ought to be aligned with contiguous
counties in delegate districts. Is failure to so align invidious discrimination? Justices Clark and Stewart in Baker v. Carr state that
some diffusion of political power is a proper state function. Under
the present legislative plan, representatives of not less than 40%
of the population of West Virginia hold a controlling majority vote
in the House. Is this the proper allowance for weighting of which
Mr. Justice Douglas admits? The federal courts in Georgia and
Tennessee apparently require that only one legislative house be
based on population. Thus, if the West Virginia Legislature were
required to redistrict the Senate, could the House remain at its
present status? These are some of the problems which could arise
on the issue of reapportionment in West Virginia.
West Virginia case law provides no ready answer to these
problems, but one case indicates that reapportionment is a justiciable
issue. In Harmison v. Ballot Comm'rs,58 it appeared that a delegate
district in the eastern panhandle was altered three years before the
oncoming census, although the West Virginia Constitution directs
that reapportionment shall occur only every ten years. In a mandamus action, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that
"the constitutionality of apportionment acts is a subject of judicial
inquiry, not merely political.... There is no room here to construe
and doubt. We must simply obey the Constitution." It would seem
that if it is mandatory not to change representation until after the
next census, it would be equally mandatory to reapportion after each
census. A more recent case, however, perhaps casts some doubt on
the weight to be accorded the prior decision. In State ex rel. Armbrecht v. Thornburg 9 plaintiff, a resident of Ohio County, sued Ohio
56
57

W. VA. CONsT. art. VI
Ross,

§ 7.

HOUSE OF DELEGATES APPORTIONMENT IN WEST VIRGINIA

Vii

(1961).

58 45 W. Va. 179, 31 S.E. 394 (1898).

59 137 W. Va. 60, 70 S.E.2d 73 (1952).
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County ballot commissioners to have the ballot show that votes could
be legally cast for four rather than three delegates. Following the
constitutional plan, Ohio County was entitled to four delegates, but
the legislature had allotted only three. Plaintiff contended that the
act by which delegates were allocated among the counties was passed
after the legislative adjournment hour, and was, therefore, void. The
West Virginia court devoted most of its opinion toward rejecting
this argument. As to the plaintiff's alternate contention that in any
event the Legislature ignored the plain language of the constitution,
the court held that it would be presumed that the Legislature considered the population of each county, absent acceptable evidence
to the contrary. The writ was refused, and the court apparently
justified the result because every county had had one delegate for
fifty years, and that seemingly it was too late to complain.
In 1962, voters soundly rejected a constitutional amendment
which would have ratified the current legislative policy of allotting
at least one delegate to all counties. Recently, the County Court
of Kanawha County instituted suit in federal district court in southern
West Virginia joining the governor and other state officials. The
complaint calls for an answer twenty days after the 1963 adjournment of the West Virginia Legislature. Apparently, this is to have a
prodding effect on the Legislature with a view toward prompt settlement.
Nationally, however, the issue of reapportionment is far from
settled. The virtual wave of cases since Baker v. Carr, of which the
cases herein discussed are only representative, bear out this conclusion. Perplexing problems have arisen as for example in Maryland,
where its senate predated the Union; in Michigan, where in 1952,
voters expressed a desire for representation on the basis of geography;
and even in West Virginia, where not only legislative action is brought
into focus, but the three-fifths ratio requirement of the constitution
itself. It is even arguable that the energy of the proponents of equal
apportionment is ill-spent. One must inevitably conclude that their
purpose is to bring good government to the states. There is, however,
respectable opinion to the contrary that equal representation does
not necessarily mean good government. In the words of Edmund
Burke,
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different
and hostile interests. . .but parliament is a deliberate assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole;
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where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to
guide, but the general good, resulting from the general
reason of the whole.6 ,
Burke did not believe that equality of representation was the fountainhead of good government. For "local prejudices" are spawned
not only in rural areas. Burke did believe that good government
flows from the moral fiber of the legislator and from the efficient
operation of political institutions. Preoccupation with mathamatical
exactitude may only cloud the true malady. Or in other words, it
is not who sends the legislators to the capitol, but which prospective
legislators are sent.
James Kilgore Edmundson, Jr.
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